


~~SECRET~~

02-00000
Copy No. 66

WEEKLY SUMMARY



Number 9
16 JUL 1948

Document No. 001
NO CHANGE in Class. ☐
☐ DECLASSIFIED
Class. CHANGED TO: TS S C
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA REG. 77/1703
Date: 31/01/78 By: 021

F-9

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~SECRET~~

1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

C O N T E N T S

	Page
HIGHLIGHTS.....	1
WESTERN EUROPE.....	3
EASTERN EUROPE.....	6
NEAR EAST - AFRICA.....	10
FAR EAST.....	12
WESTERN HEMISPHERE.....	16

SECRET

SECRET**H I G H L I G H T S**

The chief events of the past week were the Soviet replies to the western power protests regarding the Berlin blockade and the attempted assassination of Italian Communist Leader Togliatti. In its reply to the US, the Kremlin stated unequivocally that it has no intention of modifying its stand on Berlin until the western powers offer terms favorable to the USSR (see page 3). The reply took the line that although the USSR has no objections to negotiations on Berlin, such negotiations could take place only as a part of discussions on the over-all German problem. At the same time, however, the USSR has publicly admitted that the British interruption of interzonal trade, in response to the Berlin blockade, may further impair an already unsatisfactory economic situation in the Soviet occupation zone. Western German leaders concurrently have indicated their dissatisfaction with the London agreements, presumably because they feel they are being asked to operate a "fictitious and unpopular German state." The strikes and demonstrations following the attempt on Togliatti's life reflected the ferment still latent in postwar Italy (see page 4).

Gathering evidence indicates that international Communism is entering a "holding operation" stage during which the Kremlin plans to strip the Communist Parties to a hard core of fanatically faithful followers (see page 6). This week the Cominform returned to the attack against Tito, accusing him of fostering a reign of terror in Yugoslavia. Three of the Satellites, apparently at Soviet behest, applied their first serious economic sanction against the recalcitrant Yugoslav regime by placing an embargo on petroleum exports (see page 8). In Greece, Government forces continued to encounter stiff resistance from the guerrillas in the Grammos area (see page 9).

SECRET

SECRET

Jewish forces in Palestine, strengthened by materiel smuggled in during the truce, have improved their positions since the resumption of fighting. The Arabs have failed to gain the initiative. Even before the UN issued its new cease-fire order, with an accompanying threat of sanctions, there were indications that strong pressure to end the fighting might be welcomed by some Arab leaders as a means of withdrawing from their dangerous position without losing face with their own people (see page 10).

In China, the increasingly precarious position of the National Government has made its collapse at any time a distinct possibility. It is more likely, however, that Chiang's regime will not have a sudden fall but will become one of several rival authorities in China and will exercise limited power for an indefinite period (see page 12). Communist-instigated terrorism by Malayan Chinese will, [] take six months to suppress in strategically vital areas and may not be finally eradicated for three years (see page 14). Burma is the scene of widespread violence and is on the verge of political chaos from which the Communists may emerge as the strongest single force (see page 14). Concurrently, a political crisis is developing in Siam which may come to a head in late July or August.

STAT
STAT

In Latin America, increasing political instability may seriously reduce effective cooperation with the US (see page 16).

- 2 -

SECRET

SECRET

WESTERN EUROPE

GERMANY

The Soviet reply to the US protest against the Berlin blockade indicates that the Kremlin has no intention of making any concessions until the western powers offer terms favorable to the USSR. The major premise of the Soviet note is that the western powers have destroyed four-power authority in Germany by agreements made without Soviet participation and have thereby given up all moral and legal right to remain in Berlin. Although the Soviet reply stated that the USSR had no objections to negotiations on the subject of Berlin, the point was stressed that any such negotiations could only take place as part of discussions on the over-all German problem.

German dissatisfaction with the London proposals for a western German state may be attributed to the feeling that German leaders are being asked to operate a "fictitious and unpopular German state." German officials have requested that either their authority be increased proportionate to their responsibilities or that their responsibilities be decreased. The Germans suspect that the London agreements represent extensive US and UK concessions to French fears in an effort to sustain the Schuman Government. The Germans feel that no satisfactory constitutional regime for western Germany can be worked out so long as the French are permitted to retain broad supervisory powers. Much of the German pessimism springs from uneasiness regarding the outcome of the Berlin situation. The Germans undoubtedly hope, however, to obtain as a result of the current tension substantial concessions on self-government from the western powers.

The USSR won a skirmish in the Berlin blockade when the Berlin City Assembly was recently forced to adopt the Soviet Zone reichsmark as the sole currency for municipal purposes. This decision was forced upon the City Assembly when it was unable to obtain a US interim loan of 20 million Deutsche marks. Soviet authorities have now promised to release 25 million Soviet reichsmarks to the city for payment

SECRET

SECRET

GERMANY

of municipal wages and salaries. The release of these Soviet reichsmarks will tend to decrease the circulation of the already insufficient number of Deutsche marks being issued by the western powers. Any further spread in the usage of the Soviet reichsmarks may drive the western zone currency completely out of circulation. If the western zone Deutsche marks are driven out of circulation, as many Berliners in the western zones fear, the Soviet reichsmarks will become the sole currency for the entire city and the USSR will obtain full economic control of Berlin.

Soviet Zone authorities have publicly admitted for the first time that the economic situation in their zone is unsatisfactory and have warned the German population that the consequences of the British interruption of interzonal trade (in response to the Soviet blockade of Berlin) may further impair the economy. Despite these public admissions, Soviet authorities evade responsibility for the worsening economic conditions and insist that the Germans in the eastern zone are more prosperous than those in the western zones.

FRANCE

Non-Communist French labor leaders seized the initiative from the Communists by calling the current strikes in France and demanding substantial increases for low-wage government employees. The Schuman Government's prompt counteraction in mobilizing key air transportation employees, while at the same time negotiating with strike representatives, indicates that Schuman will be able to settle the strikes without seriously interfering with the Government's aggressive program to lower prices and the cost of living.

ITALY

Strikes and demonstrations following the attempted assassination of Communist Leader Togliatti are indicative of the latent ferment in post-election Italy. The demonstrations will probably subside quickly unless the situation is exacerbated

SECRET

SECRET**ITALY**

by the death of Togliatti or by an excess of zeal on the part of the police, who presently appear capable of controlling the demonstrations. The shooting of Togliatti has already strengthened the tenuous ties between the Communists and the Left Wing Socialists by reviving Communist allegations that the Government press has created anti-leftist hysteria. Togliatti's death, which would cause no basic change in the Communist Party line, would greatly reinforce those ties. Moreover, Togliatti's "martyrdom" will help silence those who have criticized the Party leaders for supporting the Cominform condemnation of Tito. Whether Togliatti lives or dies, the discontent of the Italian people over their economic condition continues strong enough to be precipitated into violence by even less serious incidents than the shooting of a political leader. Only definite action by the Government to remove the sources of discontent will finally settle the explosive situation.

NETHERLANDS

Prospects for a negotiated settlement between the Dutch and the Republican Indonesians are more remote as a result of the moderate gains registered by conservatives in the recent Netherlands elections. The negotiations have already slowed to a standstill partly because of Dutch and Indonesian disagreement over the authority to be retained by the Dutch and the sovereignty to be granted Indonesia. The conservative gains will strengthen the Dutch group which favors the retention of effective control over the Indonesian area.

SECRET

SECRET

EASTERN EUROPE

International Communism apparently is entering a "holding operation" phase, the second period of its development following World War II. During this phase, the Kremlin apparently intends to strip all Communist parties down to a hard core of fanatically faithful adherents. The first postwar phase was characterized by Communist attempts to build a broad base of popular support in all countries. Recognizing signs of diminishing returns in this program, the Kremlin is apparently willing to risk the loss of popular support in order to build a stronger core of Communist faithfuls. The disappointing Communist showing in the Italian election and the more recent defection of Yugoslav Communist leaders have undoubtedly indicated to the Kremlin that a tightening of Communist ranks was long overdue. The Cominform attack upon Tito was the signal for all Communist parties to reassess their membership. Although the popular following of local Communist parties will be reduced somewhat, the militant potentialities of the hard-core Communists, especially in Europe, will remain unaffected.

SOVIET UNION

The USSR is accelerating its synthetic fuel development program. Recent efforts include a program to bring Estonian shale production to full capacity, the further dismantling of German synthetic plants in the eastern zone, and intensive research in the production of varied types of synthetic fuels. The probable explanation for the concern of Soviet officials over the adequacy of the fuel supply, despite the fact that Soviet oil reserves are believed to be third largest in the world, is that natural petroleum production has not increased commensurately with postwar fuel consumption.

The USSR is seeking to promote utilization of fuel substitutes in those areas remote from existing centers of coal and oil supplies. The capability of the USSR for developing a useful synthetic fuel industry will depend in large measure on its ability

SECRET

SECRET

SOVIET UNION

to move, reassemble, and operate plants formerly located in Austria, Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. It will also depend on the Soviet ability to overcome handicaps presented by a lack of equipment and skilled technicians. Thus far, the synthetic fuel program has not been impressive because it has not progressed far beyond the planning stage.

During the past week, Soviet propagandists concentrated on the Berlin situation and stated repeatedly that a solution to the blockade could only be reached through four-power discussions of the entire German problem. The Cominform, however, delivered another blast at Tito, accusing him of fostering a regime of terror in Yugoslavia. In the Far East, the US was charged with designs to flood Asia with cheap Japanese goods and thus cause widespread economic dislocations.

BULGARIA

Bulgarian maneuvers along the Yugoslav border, as well as a recently increased Soviet interest in the Bulgarian Army, more probably represent a long-range endeavor to make the army an effective fighting force rather than a prelude to an attack upon Yugoslavia. The presence of Yugoslav army officers as observers throughout the maneuvers precludes the possibility that the maneuvers were designed as a war of nerves against Tito. However, Bulgaria's Yugoslav border (rather than the Turkish frontier which has been the site of annual maneuvers since 1944) was probably chosen in order to familiarize the Bulgarian Army with terrain which Communist leaders feel might become a battlefield.

SECRET

SECRET

YUGOSLAVIA

A petroleum and petroleum products embargo against Yugoslavia by Albania, Rumania, and Hungary is the first serious economic sanction to be applied by the Satellites against Tito. Because the Yugoslav economy, and particularly the Yugoslav Army, has relied solely on petroleum shipments from the Satellites, these sanctions will be more immediately felt than a general economic embargo. Tito's representatives have already approached the Aquila refinery in Trieste and a British oil company in the hope of buying oil.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The pro-American, anti-Government demonstrations in Czechoslovakia during the recent Sokol parade in Prague indicate that an effective underground resistance against the Communists may be organized. Factors which probably led to the demonstrations were the hope engendered by Tito's defiance of the Kremlin and the desperate realization that this would be the last comparatively non-Communist Sokol festival. The actual demonstrations, however, represented an expression of pent-up resentment of the patriotic Czechoslovaks against the final elimination of their democratic leaders, the destruction of their democratic rights and institutions, and their present subservience to the dictates of Soviet policy.

- 8 -

SECRET

SECRET

GREECE

Desperate guerrilla resistance is slowing down the progress of the Greek Army in the Grammos area. Only in the eastern sector of the pocket have any significant ground advances been made. In the northern sector, the army has been forced to modify its original plans and bypass several guerrilla strong points near the Albanian border. Guerrillas taken prisoner by the army, although poorly fed and clothed, were well-equipped with ammunition and medical supplies. Guerrilla morale has apparently not been seriously impaired by the pounding taken from Greek artillery and aircraft. Judging from the reported movement of three large bands (totaling 2,300 men) westward to the battle area, guerrilla leaders are committing more men to the Grammos struggle. Although some of these units may be deployed as diversionary groups instead of being used as reinforcements within the operational area, their commitment is good evidence of guerrilla determination.

A guerrilla defeat in the Grammos battle would not bring about an immediate collapse of the guerrilla movement. However, a poor showing on their part would probably convince the Kremlin that the guerrillas were no longer deserving of the material aid now being received from Albania and Bulgaria. In a supreme effort to forestall such a development, guerrilla leaders may decide to throw all of their available forces into the battle.

SECRET

11021



SECRET**NEAR EAST - AFRICA****PALESTINE**

The improvement of the Jewish military position appears to be the most striking aspect of the Palestine situation as the fighting resumes. Near Tel Aviv, Hagana forces have captured Ramle and the important Lydda airport, making it practically certain that the next big Jewish objective will be Latrun, the last major barrier to reopening of the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem supply road. Hagana and Irgun leaders are obviously satisfied with their situation in Jerusalem. Despite spasmodic UN checking during the truce, the Jews have not only obtained large shipments of food and gasoline but have also smuggled in arms and ammunition from Tel Aviv over the newly-built "Burma Road." The recent Jewish seizure of the strategically located King David Hotel indicates that the next Jewish move might be an attempt to re-enter the Old City. Although the principal Jewish effort thus far has been on the central front, some Israeli forces are working to neutralize Egyptian thrusts in the vicinity of Isdud, south of Tel Aviv, while other Jewish troops have been engaged in consolidating Israel's control over eastern and western Galilee.

Although the Arab armies have also improved their positions somewhat during the truce, they have failed to obtain the initiative. Following the loss of Ramle and Lydda, the Arabs threaten the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road only in the Latrun-Bab el Wad area. The Egyptian thrust northward along the coastal plain appears at least temporarily stalled near Isdud. Iraqi troops have been shelling the Tel Aviv suburbs from the vicinity of Ras el Ain; other Iraqi forces are said to be attacking toward Afula in Galilee; and Syrian detachments have made some gains around Mishmar Hay Yarden in the Lake Hula region. There apparently has been little Arab Legion activity, suggesting that Abdullah's forces may have been ordered to refrain from taking the offensive. Meanwhile, there are indications that strong UN pressure to end the fighting might be welcomed by some Arab leaders as a means of withdrawing from their precarious military position without losing face among the Arab peoples.

SECRET

SECRET

INDIA

Tension in Kashmir has increased slightly since the recent lull in the fighting. The Indian Army had made only limited territorial gains in its recent operations but, by inducing additional thousands of Moslems to flee Kashmir, has aggravated Pakistan's refugee problem and has eliminated potential pro-Pakistan votes in a plebiscite. The presence of at least 10,000 Pakistan Army troops in Kashmir is an additional complication. Pakistan military officials are again expressing the fear that open war will result if there are further Indian advances. Meanwhile, the UN Kashmir Commission has arrived in New Delhi via Karachi. The Pakistan Government received the Commission cordially, and India is expected to be hospitable. Nevertheless, neither dominion has shown any real disposition to work toward a compromise.

IRAN

The Shah of Iran is determined to embark on his proposed trip to England despite the opposition of the Majlis and the advice of leading Iranian officials to postpone the journey. During the Shah's absence, leaders of the political opposition may take the opportunity to bring about the fall of the Hajir Government, which the Shah has supported.

SECRET

SECRET

FAR EAST

CHINA

The precarious position of the National Government may lead to its collapse at any time. Despite its highly dubious chances of survival, the regime may not have a sudden or spectacular fall. Instead it may merely become one of several rival authorities in China and as such exercise nominal power for an indefinite period. Chiang Kai-shek's importance as a political factor is steadily declining. Many Chinese have even expressed resentment against US aid on the grounds that such aid merely prolongs the civil war and postpones the fall of Chiang Kai-shek's government, which they consider hopelessly corrupt and ineffective. Nationalist forces continue to suffer heavy losses in the field. Growing civilian unrest may soon spread to the army, which has already shown marked tendencies to avoid combat and even to go over to the Communist side. The unchecked inflationary upswing continues to be reflected in exchange and commodity markets and in the accelerated flight of real wealth to safe havens. In areas of Nationalist China remote from Nanking, military and political power increasingly is being exercised independently by regional leaders. However, as long as Chiang Kai-shek is the recipient of US aid, Nationalist leaders who hope to derive US benefits correspondingly may be deterred from open defection. Marshal Li Chi-shen's Revolutionary Committee in Hong Kong is expected soon to proclaim from southwest China a rival "provisional government" which probably will find support in one or more provinces. Marshal Li will seek to increase that support by calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the formation of a coalition government including the Communists. For the immediate future, however, it remains doubtful that any single leader or group in Nationalist China is capable of supplanting Chiang's government.

SECRET

SECRET

JAPAN

Japan's new export shipbuilding program calls for the construction for foreign delivery of steel merchant vessels, some of which are over 6,000 gross tons. On 26 June, negotiations were under way for the construction of 82 such vessels: 39 for the US, 33 for Norway, 6 for Denmark, 3 for the Philippines, and 1 for France. Inquiries concerning orders had also been received from Italy, Australia, and Sweden. Some vessels are also being built for the Japanese, all under 6,000 tons. The program has brought forth a British protest and has attracted the attention of the Far Eastern Commission and US industrial interests. The UK Government claims that current discussions in the Commission on Japanese shipbuilding capacity may be prejudiced by giving the Japanese permission to engage in the shipbuilding program. Further opposition to Japanese shipbuilding for export may develop as a consequence of: (1) concern that, once free of foreign supervision, Japan could turn "excess" shipbuilding capacity to aggressive purposes; and (2) the desire of maritime nations to free their own shipbuilders from competition and to obtain maximum utilization of their shipping by other nations.

KOREA

The establishment of two competing "national" regimes in Korea now appears imminent. The National Assembly in South Korea has adopted a constitution and is scheduled to announce the formation of the Republic of Korea in early August; the US plans to recognize this regime as "the national Government of Korea envisaged by the General Assembly resolutions." Concurrently, the hastily reconvened North Korean People's Council, after denouncing US "unilateral" action in South Korea, has promulgated its own Soviet-model constitution and has scheduled elections on 25 August for the establishment of a Democratic Korean People's Republic in which South Korea will ostensibly be represented. The USSR undoubtedly will recognize its North Korean puppet regime as "national" in character and follow its formation with renewed pressure for the withdrawal of all occupation forces. The Soviet aim will be to deprive the US of an opportunity to establish a native security force in South Korea adequate to deal with aggression from the North Korean People's Army.

SECRET

SECRET

MALAYA

Present unrest in Malaya springs to a considerable degree from Communist exploitation of the dissatisfaction of large numbers of Malayan Chinese with their economic situation and their political status under the existing Malayan constitution. The policy established by the British set up strict citizenship requirements for non-Malays and placed the Malays in a politically dominant role in the Federation of Malaya. Thus, the Chinese, who are approximately equal to the Malays in numbers and who form the backbone of the labor force in rubber and tin, are relegated to the status of an unimportant minority. Confronted with the realization that these conditions (which the local Communists have exploited by means of terrorist outbreaks) cannot be eradicated by military action alone, the UK Government must not only undertake to eliminate subversive elements in Malaya but must find a solution, which will not jeopardize British control of tin and rubber, to the problem of the Chinese residents.

A swift, successful campaign by British military forces against the guerrilla bands could isolate the terrorists in the hinterlands and remove the immediate threat to tin and rubber production. The success of the campaign will depend, however, upon British ability to drive the terrorists from the vital areas of Malaya and to prevent them from receiving reinforcements and supplies via the Siamese border and the east coast. The British estimate that the initial campaign to clear vital areas will take six months but that final eradication of terrorist activities might extend over two or three years. During this time, mines, plantations, and lines of communication would require constant protection.

BURMA

Burma is on the verge of political chaos and possible widespread violence. The complete disintegration of the government party--the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL)--is being precipitated by factional strife among the League's components. The two major groupings have split apparently over Premier Thakin Nu's leftist unity program and the government's

SECRET

SECRET

BURMA

military campaign against the insurrectionary Communists. Consequent rivalry concerning the successor to Thakin Nu (who has declared his intention to resign on 20 July) has critically weakened the coalition party. The sustained political crisis is jeopardizing the production of rice upon which Burma's economy is based and may increase dissatisfaction and unrest among ethnic minority groups. Under these conditions, the emergence of the Communist Party as the strongest single force in Burma becomes an increasing possibility.

SIAM

The developing political crisis in Siam may come to a head in late July or early August. The supporters of Elder Statesman Pridi, who was forced to leave the country following the November 1947 coup by Phibul, are disturbed by the Government's efforts to bring Pridi to trial for alleged complicity in the death of King Ananda in 1946. Moreover, the profiteering activities of Phibul's chief supporter, Deputy Army Commander Kach, have aroused increasing dissatisfaction within the military. Both developments may lead to violence and a showdown between Phibul on one hand and anti-Kach elements and Pridi supporters on the other hand. Rumors of an impending coup against the Phibul regime may have been circulated by the opposition groups as a means of forcing a compromise or of ascertaining domestic and international support for such a move. The fact that Phibul is taking armed precautions, however, suggests that he is prepared to give some credence to the rumors.

SECRET

SECRET

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Increasing instability in Latin America may seriously reduce effective cooperation with the US. The stability of Latin America has been shaken by: (1) the impact of rising import prices on economies based on raw materials; (2) the disappearance of former bases of political power; and (3) the exploitation by political groups of the increasing power of labor. The unhealthy political condition of the entire area is emphasized by the continuing rivalry between opposed Caribbean alignments, the internal struggles for power in Ecuador, Panama, and Peru, the doubtful stability of the Bolivian Government, and the inability of Chile's president to govern without the use of extraordinary powers. Even Argentina must readjust to the disappearance of its sellers' market. Merely palliative measures, such as the suppression of Communist parties, cannot be expected to cure the underlying unrest, to create new broad bases of political power, or to reduce the capabilities of subversive elements to exploit these unsettled situations. Therefore, governments, such as Colombia, show a tendency to lapse into inertia as a result of domestic crises. Increasing pressure for US aid is an indication that the Latin American countries now lack the internal means of achieving economic or political stability.

ARGENTINA

Drastic emergency measures by the Peron administration will be required if Argentina is to maintain its independent economic course and adjust to its existing dollar shortage. The disappearance of the postwar sellers' market, which had allowed Argentina to accelerate its industrialization program and increase Argentine influence abroad, has forced the Government to place severe restrictions on its foreign trade in order to prevent further depletion of its dwindling hard-currency holdings. Argentina is presently adopting measures to stimulate

SECRET

SECRET

ARGENTINA

trade with non-dollar countries, including the USSR and its Satellite states. Unless Argentina receives substantial dollar aid from ECA purchases, the continued dollar shortage is expected to strengthen nationalist elements within the Government and to place a further strain on Argentine relations with the US. Inter-American relations may then be adversely affected by Argentine propaganda that would portray the US as having refused, for imperialistic motives, to buy supplies for ECA from Argentina. Among Latin American countries, such propaganda might have some degree of success in opposing US objectives in Hemisphere cooperation.

- 17 -

SECRET

SECRET**DISTRIBUTION**

1. The President
2. Secretary of State
3. Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief
4. Secretary of Defense
5. Secretary of the Army
6. Secretary of the Navy
7. Secretary of the Air Force
8. Chairman, National Security Resources Board
9. Executive Secretary, National Security Council
10. Assistant Secretary of Navy for Air
11. Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
- 12,13,14. . . . Chief of Naval Operations
- 15,16,17. . . . Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
18. Director of Plans and Operations, General Staff, U.S. Army
19. Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) U.S. Air Force
20. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
21. Director of Plans and Operations, U.S. Air Force
- 22,23,24. . . . Special Assistant to Secretary of State, Research &
Intelligence
- 25,26,27,28,29. Director of Intelligence, General Staff, U.S. Army
- 30,31,32,33,34. Chief of Naval Intelligence
- 35,36,37,38,39. Director of Intelligence, U.S. Air Force
40. Director of Security and Intelligence, Atomic Energy Comm.
41. Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee, Atomic
Energy Commission
- 42,43,44,45,46. Chief, Acquisition & Distribution Division, OICD, Dept. State
47. Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
48. Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
49. Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Dept. State
50. Secretary of State (Attention: Mr. Barnes)
51. Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
- 52,53. Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
54. U.S. Air Force Representative on Joint Strategic
Survey Committee
- 55,56. Secretary, State-Army-Navy-Air Coordinating Committee

SECRET

SECRET